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THE CHANGING SECURITY POLICY CHALLENGES IN CENTRAL ASIA
Allison, Roy, and Lena Jonson, eds. Central Asian Security: The New International Context. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 279pp. $18.95

To date, relatively few studies have appeared concerning the domestic and external security environments of the five
new independent states of Central Asia
or on relations with their neighbors to
the north, south, east, and west. This volume, with contributions by some of the
leading scholars in the field, seeks to fill
in the lacunae in both areas. It does an
admirable job.
The book begins by putting into context
the impact of the collapse of the Soviet
Union on these new independent states.
Initially, the assumption within Russia,
the West, and among the elites of the
new republics was that the new Central
Asian republics would maintain a close
alignment with the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia
had vast economic, security, and military
interests in the region and clearly aspired
to maintain a leading position in that
area. Western observers were generally
convinced that Russia would be able to
maintain its position in the “stans.” As
for the elites, their natural inclination
was to maintain strong and tight links
with the former ruler, a tendency reinforced by the “Soviet-era socialization”
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and the looming presence of Russia in
Central Asia, often in the form of military forces and bases. However, Russia
failed to maintain its position there, because of its chronic domestic weaknesses,
its inability to formulate a coherent national security policy, and its lack of
resources.
By the mid-1990s it was recognized by all
parties concerned that no tight strategic
nexus would exist between Russia and
the Central Asian republics. The elites
also realized that their post-Soviet security environment was a complex one,
with many issues that could not be addressed by simply maintaining a strong
strategic relationship with the former Soviet Union. Indeed, there was a growing
desire on the part of the elites to focus on
their internal security problems, diversify
their security policy relations away from
Russia, and form new partnerships with
other nations, both near and far. In light
of this emerging strategic reconfiguration, the purpose of this work is to “analyse the changing security policy
challenges in Central Asia since Russia
became more disengaged from the region
in the mid to late 1990s” and to “discuss
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the security policy relevance of the expanding network of relationships between Central Asia and regional and
international powers.”
Some of the contributors to this work address the cooperative and conflictual processes that are relevant for the security
orientation of the region. There are numerous cooperative processes in Central
Asia. The states have a common legacy
and cultural and historical commonalities. The Soviet era provided them with a
common interlocking transportation system, energy grids, and irrigation systems.
On the face of it, such factors should enhance cooperative endeavors that could
be formalized by institutional mechanisms. But processes born of ethnic rivalries and deteriorating social and
economic conditions are also deep at
work in the region, a topic analyzed extensively in Martha Brill Olcott’s essay.
Also, the piece by Alexei Malashenko on
the potential of Islam in Central Asia is
particularly apposite in light of the impact of 11 September 2001 on the region.
The Central Asian states are united by
the common heritage of Islam, but the
elites are fearful that Islam could become
a source of conflict because of the use of
religion by opposition parties and the hijacking of Islam by extremist movements
that have a proclivity to terrorism. Not
surprisingly, these states have worked
with Russia to combat the growth of terrorist organizations using religion. In
light of the increased American presence
in Central Asia, one wonders whether the
United States will supplant Russia in the
republics’ struggle against terrorism. Another source of conflict within the region
is the struggle over scarce water resources. The essay by Stuart Horsman
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deals with this issue. Horsman concludes,
however, that frictions over water are unlikely to lead to violent conflict.
The remaining essays address the important issue of how the involvement of external powers—both regional, such as
Iran and Turkey, and great powers, such
as Russia, China, and the United
States—affect the security dynamics of
the region. Some of these powers are involved in Central Asia because of historical and cultural affinities. This
framework helps to explain Turkish and
Iranian interests in the fate of peoples
with shared religion and ethnic identities,
and the Russian interest in the fate of the
largest republic, Kazakhstan, with its sizable Russian population. Economic interests, in the shape of potentially
lucrative trade, investments, and exploitation of vast oil and natural gas reserves,
partly account for the involvement in
Central Asia of all the powers addressed
in this book. Security interests have
much to do with the direct involvement
in the region of Russia, China, and Iran.
All three are concerned about the potential spillover of unrest from Central Asia
across their borders. Finally, strategic interests explain the involvement of all the
nations discussed here, in terms of their
visions of their respective roles in Central
Asia. Stephen Blank’s essay is especially
pertinent.
This work is a welcome addition to the
study of Central Asia. It is a critical addition to the understanding of security issues in the region, and it is required
reading to understand better the war on
terror and future U.S. relations with the
Central Asia republics.
AHMED HASHIM

Naval War College
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Natsios, Andrew S. The Great North Korean Famine:
Famine, Politics, and Foreign Policy. Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Institute for Peace, 2001. 295pp. $19.95

Though not linked to the tragedy of 11
September 2001, North Korea rose once
again to near the top of the list of likely
U.S. adversaries with President George
W. Bush’s association of Pyongyang with
a so-called axis of evil. This fine book by
Andrew Natsios should be required
reading for those contemplating the various policy dilemmas that confront the
U.S. on the Korean Peninsula. Natsios
provides an eloquent and informed narrative of evil as it exists today in North
Korea—the slow and tortured death of
millions of North Korean citizens by
starvation as a direct result of the regime’s totalitarian nature and its failure to reform disastrous economic
policies. But the author also demonstrates that the North Korean quandary
defies simple solution.
The book compellingly captures the human side of this international tragedy.
Indeed, this aspect of the “rogue state”
phenomenon is too often brushed aside
in favor of high-politics approaches that
degenerate into sterile discussions of
containment, sanctions, and arms control possibilities. By contrast, Natsios’s
descriptions of the prevailing conditions
in North Korea and the behavior of its
leaders and national security apparatus
are graphic enough to turn the reader’s
stomach. Thus he recounts the testimony
of refugees who escaped to China: “In
most cases the [group] suicides were
committed by younger couples with
smaller children; the couples had been
denying themselves food for so long they
feared they would die before their children did and that their children would be
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left to fend for themselves.” Natsios describes observing, from the Chinese side
of the Tyumen River, North Koreans on
the opposite bank “dumping wrapped
bodies into a large pit,” one of a number
of suspected mass graves in the region.
Few are as qualified to tell this story as
Natsios. Though not a specialist on Korea, he is an expert on disaster relief operations, with wide experience both in
the U.S. government and civilian organizations. This breadth of experience allows him to put the Korean situation into
a wider social and historical context. He
offers many insightful comparisons to
earlier famines in Ethiopia, China, and
the Soviet Union. As vice president of
World Vision from 1993 to 1998, Natsios
made numerous trips to North Korea
and the bordering areas of China during
the mid-1990s. President Bush appointed
him director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is certain
to play a leading role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, among other missions integral to the war on terror. In
addition, as a U.S. Army veteran of the
Persian Gulf War, the author brings to
the analysis a fluency on strategic issues
that military readers are certain to appreciate. Thus his conclusions about the situation in contemporary North Korea go
far beyond the speculation that is the
norm for this closed state.
As a witness to the unfolding food emergency in North Korea, Natsios developed
strong opinions about responsibility for
the tragedy. He argues that culpability
goes beyond the pathetic and cruel leadership in Pyongyang to the international
community, and to the Clinton administration in particular—which took action
only after the worst of the famine had
passed, in the autumn of 1996. Natsios
sharply criticizes Clinton for using food
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aid as a diplomatic tool to coax concessions
from Pyongyang. He maintains that such
a position is ethically indefensible, since
it punishes innocent populations, people
who are unable to affect their government’s policies.
The book does have a few weaknesses.
First, its organization may prove frustrating. Different chapters focus on various
perspectives of the famine, but this approach leads to some confusion about
the overall chronology of events, which,
given the complexity of the subject, is
quite difficult to grasp. A second flaw is
the lack of photographs. This in itself
would not be a problem if no such photos existed, but Natsios makes a point of
emphasizing the importance of photographs in conveying the reality of a famine. He also discusses the works of
specific photographers but then fails to
explain their absence. Finally, the overall
analysis of the United States and North
Korean interaction might have been
stronger if greater attention had been
paid to the nuclear proliferation issue.
Certainly this was the most important
concern in conditioning relations between the two countries, but Natsios
hardly broaches the subject.
Overall, this study is an essential addition
to recent scholarship on North Korea,
which has not paid adequate attention to
the human tragedy as it unfolded during
the last decade. While Natsios makes a
strong case for breaking the link between
food aid and U.S. strategic interests, one
wonders if relief efforts are aiding the
North Korean regime and thus prolonging the catastrophe that Natsios has so eloquently described.
LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN

Naval War College
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Wirtz, James J., and Jeffrey A. Larsen, eds. Rockets’ Red
Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics.
Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2001. 352pp. $28.50

When President George W. Bush made
his remark about the “axis of evil” in his
2002 State of the Union address, he
publicly exposed the ballistic missile
threat Iran, Iraq, and North Korea pose
to the United States and its allies. So
far, media concern has concentrated
only on his name-calling. Rockets’ Red
Glare explores the missile defenses
designed to counteract the threat from
these countries.
James J. Wirtz, a national security affairs
professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate
School, and Jeffrey A. Larsen, a senior
policy analyst of the Science Applications
International Corporation, edited this
book, which is an anthology of papers
written to explore the implications of national missile defense (NMD). Contributors had a common assumption— that
NMD will be deployed in a national security environment with either a modified
antiballistic missile (ABM) treaty or no
antiballistic missile treaty at all. This assumption allowed them to focus on the
strategic level consequences of an NMD
deployment; the editors then asked them
to examine three levels of NMD deployment. These are “Limited Defense in a
Cooperative Setting, “Enhanced Defenses and the Limits of Cooperation,”
and “Unlimited Defenses Unconstrained
by Treaty.”
Wirtz and Larsen organized their anthology in these three major parts. The “ABM
Regime” provides historical background. Kerry Kartchner, the State Department’s senior representative to the
Standing Consultative Commission in
Geneva, Switzerland, researched the
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origins of the ABM Treaty. Robert Joseph (special assistant to the president
and senior director for proliferation
strategy, counterproliferation, and homeland defense) reviewed the changes in the
political-military landscape. Dennis
Ward, a professional staff member of the
Senate Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, examined
changes in technology since the inception
of the ABM Treaty and their impact on
both offensive and defensive systems.
Part 2 is entitled “Defense, Arms Control, and Crisis Stability.” Michael
O’Hanlon, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, takes the
lead by looking at the ramifications of
NMD deployment on U.S. politics. Richard Harknett, associate professor of political science at the University of
Cincinnati, focuses on how the strategic
landscape will change with NMD deployment. Julian Schofield, an assistant professor at Concordia University, Montreal,
analyzes NMD deployment in a multilateral arms control environment.
Part 3, “Regional Responses to National
Missile Defense,” divides the world outside the United States into regions, and
in some instances specific countries, examining the effect NMD deployment
may have. Bradley Roberts, a member of
the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses, reviews the impact NMD
deployment may have on China and
what its responses will likely be. Ivo H.
Daalder, a senior fellow in foreign policy
studies at the Brookings Institution, and
James Goldgeier, acting director of the
Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, look at NMD deployment from a
Russian perspective. Timothy D. Hoyt,
director of special programs and adjunct
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professor in the national security studies
program at Georgetown University,
analyzes the effects of NMD deployment
on the states of South Asia, an area
prominent in the current environment.
Charles Ball, a senior scientist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory,
studies the wide variety of views held by
U.S. global allies.
The book’s appendices provide source
documents, including the ABM Treaty itself and related documents that further
refine the initial treaty. Presidential
speeches on NMD conclude the appendices: President Bill Clinton’s speech of 1
September 2000 deferring a decision on
NMD; George W. Bush’s speech as a presidential candidate delivered on 23 May
2000; and his presidential speech at the
National Defense University on 1 May
2001.
As one who has a limited role in the operational aspects of NMD, I found in this
book the historical context and strategic
implications of its deployment, at least
prior to the events of 11 September 2001.
Obviously, those events could not have
been foreseen, but we may suspect that
the September tragedy would significantly reinforce the conclusions reached
by the editors and contributors.
President Bush’s 2002 State of the Union
address showed a new willingness on the
part of the United States to confront aggressively and directly the threats posed
by Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. NMD
provides defense against these specific
ballistic missile threats. But if U.S. political determination removes the ballistic
missile threat from these states, what
then for NMD? If NMD deployment continues, absent a threat from Iran, Iraq,
and North Korea, what effect will that
have on the global landscape? Will a
capabilities-based argument against an
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undefined and unknown emerging threat
be acceptable to the rest of the world?
Rockets’ Red Glare has my wholehearted
recommendation. However, it must now
be read with an active consideration of,
and sober reflection on, the impact of the
attacks of 11 September 2001 and their
aftermath, the war on terrorism.
CARL SCHLOEMANN

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Miller, Judith, Stephen Engelberg, and William
Broad. Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.
382pp. $27

In 1988, only two years before the Soviet
empire fell, secret scientific efforts were
still turning germs into weapons and creating entirely new germs. In Koltsovo, a
hidden Siberian city, scientist Nikolai
Ustinov died from an accident while
working with the Marburg virus, designed to bleed victims to death. With
clinical detachment, he documented his
own decline in a journal with bloodspotted pages. His colleagues found that
the virus had mutated while killing him.
Their response was consistent with their
careers—they buried the scientist in a
zinc-lined coffin and turned the “new”
virus into a weapon, naming it “Variant
U,” in tribute to Ustinov.
That story, with its multiple layers of
horror, shows why reality is often more
remarkable than the best novel. It also
has important parallels to current concerns over states that manufacture and
prepare living weapons for deployment.
Iraq again made the news when in March
2002 Iraqi civil engineer Adnan Sayeed,
along with another defector, smuggled
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out evidence of Iraq’s ongoing germ weapons program. Then there is Iran. This
book reprises the authors’ earlier reporting on wide-ranging, well-funded Iranian
efforts to buy up talent from destitute
Soviet weapons labs.
This is an important book on current affairs, crafted in an accessible style by
three professionals of the New York
Times who have excellent contacts in the
federal government. William Broad is a
science writer who has shared two Pulitzer Prizes. Stephen Engelberg has long
reported on national security issues. Judith Miller has done groundbreaking investigations on anti-American terrorists.
Although their report is not what might
have been done by a blue-ribbon scientific panel, it is reaching a much larger
audience. Moreover, it deserves favorable
notice as an original work created well
before the 2001 anthrax attacks.
Germs is not specifically about biological
threats posed by small terrorist groups; it
focuses on state producers of “super
germs”—disease-generating organisms to
be used in military weapons systems. It
discusses the tension between developing
biological weapons and devising programs to counter them. Any argument as
to whether a weapons program is for offense or defense (as Winston Churchill
showed in a humorous “disarmament fable” in October 1928) is more about intentions and regimes and fears than
about actual weapons. That leaves challenging ambiguities. Parts of this book
appear to be directed against any U.S.
government germ work that goes beyond
research and into development. Its wider
appeal is that all countries be kept within
bounds by treaty law.
Several small flaws are apparent. One
paragraph flatly dismisses the value of all
U.S. Senate hearings as mere stage
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productions. This idea is silly and elitist,
and is disproved by the authors themselves. In several other passages they discuss significant congressional work,
including a hearing by former senator
John Glenn, who chaired the Intergovernmental Affairs Committee.
There is no criticism of President Bill
Clinton in this book. The authors repeatedly show him in a good light as prodding the lethargic toward caring about
this new and very dangerous problem.
The authors do admit to lapses in his administration, but they attribute them to
others—for example, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, who in a press conference hoisted a five-pound bag of sugar
to make a point about how anthrax could
kill half the District of Columbia. Some
think he exaggerated (and the authors
agree), yet when reporting the argument
Miller, Engelberg, and Broad treat Cohen
unfairly by mixing references to Washington, D.C., and its far larger metro
area. Also, just how much should one
care if Cohen’s five-pound bag of sugar
was light by two pounds, or ten, when
the next chapter states that the Soviets
were making 4,500 metric tons of anthrax every year?
The efforts by many U.S. officials and
scientists were important responses to a
reality well stated in this work: the U.S.
public health system must be better integrated into its national defenses—a need
recognized early on in Cold War civil defense. Although civil defense later declined, by 1989 the need, if not apparent,
was nonetheless great. Iraq was busy
brewing veritable swimming pools full of
anthrax, tularemia, glanders, bubonic
plague, as well as smaller amounts of
other agents. The Soviets’ formidable
biopreparat program would remain dangerous, even in decline, and even now
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Russia cannot be fully trusted on biowar
issues, say the authors.
Information on biological agent production came to light throughout the 1990s.
Weapons of mass destruction are now a
prime reason why the hottest topic in
Washington is “unfinished business”
with Baghdad. But with that challenge
comes another. Whatever the world community may do to stop Iraq’s weapon
development program, Iran will still
remain, wealthier than its neighbor and
equally ready to kill people, as proven by
three decades of transnational terrorism
and ongoing development of a range of
weapons of mass destruction. North Korea is still an odd blend of militarism,
weapons of mass destruction, and occasional fatuity. There must be a strategy
that deals with more than Saddam
Hussein alone.
CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON

Alexandria, Virginia
author of Terrorism Today

Duncan, Francis. Rickover: The Struggle for Excellence. Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute Press,
2001. 416pp. $37.50

Dr. Francis Duncan served as the official
historian to the Atomic Energy Commission and Department of Energy and
worked in Admiral Hyman G. Rickover’s
office from 1969 until Rickover’s retirement in 1982. Duncan also has had access to much of Rickover’s personal
correspondence, as well as that of his immediate family. Indeed, Rickover’s
widow wrote the foreword to this book.
This is Duncan’s third book on Rickover,
for whom he candidly admits great admiration. Although the author’s familiarity
with and admiration for his subject
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defines the book and gives it credibility,
it also constitutes the book’s greatest
weakness.
Duncan thoroughly chronicles Rickover’s
methods of achieving his goals. This
makes compelling reading for anyone
familiar with the U.S. Navy’s nuclear
propulsion program. Past and present
nuclear-trained officers and sailors will
likely be fascinated by how Rickover manipulated naval and congressional bureaucratic processes to achieve his goals.
Many may find themselves nodding
familiarly at Duncan’s incantations of
Rickover’s proven formula for success—
hard work, sacrifice, self-discipline, conservative engineering, and technical mastery. Others, however, may shake their
heads when they read how Rickover plotted and pulled strings to achieve flag
rank, and how he fought retirement,
serving as an admiral for more than
twenty-seven years until he finally retired
at the age of eighty-one, in 1982. Still, although these stories are interesting and
tell us much about Rickover’s character,
a biography should offer more.
As Duncan aptly shows, Rickover is justly
remembered as the father of the nuclear
navy. However, Rickover is almost
equally remembered for his abrasive and
disdainful behavior, his vindictiveness,
and his arrogance. Unfortunately,
Duncan pays little attention to these
characteristics, mentioning them only
briefly. True, Duncan does acknowledge
that Rickover could be unpleasant. He
tells how in 1951 an admiral advised
Rickover that “he could not get along
with people” and pointed out how in a
lecture Rickover had angered his audience of submarine officers “by talking
down to them and calling them stupid.”
This anecdote is notable, however, for its
inclusion rather than its honesty. Instead
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of acknowledging and criticizing, or at
least lamenting, Rickover’s difficult personality, Duncan asks readers to empathize with the man. For example, in 1958
Rickover was not invited to the White
House reception honoring USS Nautilus’s passage under the North Pole. This
slight, says Duncan, “hurt him deeply.”
Years later, in 1982, Rickover unleashed a
tirade during a meeting with President
Ronald Reagan, venting “the fury of a
goaded man who felt manipulated, patronized, and humiliated.” But it is difficult to feel much sorrow for the old
admiral, who, at least by reputation, was
so often guilty of even worse behavior.
One can imagine that Rickover’s
long-standing adversaries and enemies
would be acutely aware of Duncan’s apparently inadvertent irony.
Another weakness is Duncan’s short
shrift to Rickover’s private life. In the
early chapters, Duncan makes significant
use of letters between Rickover and his
first wife during their courtship and early
marriage, but that’s it. His first wife receives little further mention, and his son
receives even less. Rickover’s second
marriage gets only slightly more attention. The near absence of discussion between Rickover and family or friends
leaves a critical void. No reason is offered
for these omissions. Perhaps Duncan believed that Rickover, private citizen, did
not warrant as much attention as
Rickover, public servant. Perhaps
Rickover’s family authorized the biography on the condition that his personal
life remain off limits. The absence of this
material is striking and yet possibly revealing. It could be that once Rickover lost
himself in his work, his family life suffered, which would not be surprising.
Rickover demanded that level of commitment and sacrifice from those who
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worked for him, and all indications are
that he demanded the same of himself.
One comes away from this biography
with an appreciation for Rickover’s accomplishments in the Navy but with no
understanding of the man. Rickover certainly left an enduring and immensely
valuable legacy, but Duncan should have
been fully open and fair, reporting all the
pertinent aspects of his life. A biography
should neither unduly venerate nor unjustly condemn. Duncan comes perilously close to writing a hagiography.
Most readers would have much preferred
honesty and a more complete depiction
of the complex human being Hyman
Rickover was.
WILLIAM S. MURRAY

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Ring, Jim. We Come Unseen. London: John Murray,
2001. 270pp. £20

Books about submarines are generally
disapproved of, unless they are technical
volumes describing the characteristics
and performance of potentially hostile
fleets. A couple of recent accounts of
American operations have run into shallow water. For example, Roger Dunham
was obliged to censor much of his Spy
Sub (Naval Institute Press, 1996) and
conceal the fact that he had served on the
USS Halibut on classified projects, one of
which was the discovery of the wreck of a
Soviet submarine in the Pacific. Exercising discretion, Dunham called his boat
Viperfish and never identified the K-219,
the Soviet Golf II that went down in 1968
with ballistic missiles aboard and became
the target of a celebrated CIA salvage operation, code-named JENNIFER.
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Two years later, Dunham’s efforts to
comply with the demands of the U.S.
Navy to protect Halibut proved counterproductive when Sherry Sontag, Christopher Drew, and Annette Lawrence Drew
published their best-selling Blind Man’s
Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage (PublicAffairs, 1998).
Their detailed description of the eavesdropping and other secret operations
conducted by Halibut over many years
had clearly been informed by inside
sources. Finally, John Pina Craven, formerly the chief scientist with the U.S.
Navy’s Special Projects program, released
The Silent War: The Cold War Battle beneath the Sea (Simon & Schuster, 2001),
giving more details of Halibut’s activities
and providing his own astonishing explanation of the loss of the K-219. According
to Craven, the Soviet submarine’s commander had been preparing for a rogue
missile launch aimed at Hawaii when his
vessel sustained a sudden, catastrophic accident that sent it plunging to the sea floor.
Until recently, such disclosures have
been uniquely American, with almost
nothing released in England about the
Royal Navy’s nuclear partnership with its
U.S. cousins or about its contributions
to the clandestine combat fought in the
Arctic against the “boomers” (ballisticmissile submarines) of the Red Banner
Northern Fleet. That silence has now
been broken by Jim Ring, who marks the
British submarine service’s centenary
with remarkable revelations about the
cat-and-mouse games played off
Murmansk, the extraordinary phenomenon of “ice damage” (a euphemism for
underwater collision), as well as the deployment of hunter-killer submarines to
the South Atlantic in 1982 during the
Falklands War.
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Possessing a relatively small fleet of submarines, at least in comparison to the
United States, Britain requires its boats
to fulfill several different roles. The
smaller diesel-electrics are equipped to
support teams of the Special Boat Squadron (SBS), who train continuously to
perfect their covert infiltration skills and
develop new techniques to counter terrorists and drug smugglers. The Poseidonarmed deterrent force undertakes long
patrols and generally avoids surfacing so
as to maintain a credible threat to a potential aggressor. For the hunter-killers,
the task has been to shadow potential targets, raise antennas in dangerous waters
to collect signals intelligence, and occasionally make goodwill visits to carefully
selected ports to reinforce diplomatic
messages.
Thus a courtesy invitation in Rio de
Janeiro to the Argentine naval attaché to
come aboard and enjoy a drink had a
very specific objective; it certainly made
clear the wisdom of not attempting to
mount any amphibious landings on disputed territories in the region. This useful exercise was executed with total
success in 1977, when HMS Dreadnought participated in Operation JOURNEYMAN, now regarded as a classic of
deterrence. Unfortunately there was no
time to repeat it in 1982 before General
Leopoldo Galtieri seized the opportunity to launch a surprise invasion of the
Falklands.
While much has been published concerning the Falklands War, two aspects
have remained under wraps. First, there
is the vexed question of what nuclear
munitions were temporarily lost when
the destroyer Coventry and the frigates
Antelope and Ardent were sunk by Argentine aircraft in San Carlos Water.
Such issues are never debated in public
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in Britain, although reports have circulated of specialist divers engaged in the
recovery of atomic depth charges. The
second aspect, usually touched upon
only when HMS Conqueror is referred to
as the submarine responsible for sinking
the cruiser General Belgrano, concerns
the mission of that submarine and the
other four attack boats that played unseen roles in the conflict. Where were
Valiant, Spartan, and Splendid? They too
were making a vital contribution, monitoring enemy aircraft from the Argentine mainland and giving valuable
two-hour warnings of air raids. As for
the diesel-powered Onyx, which took a
month to reach the Total Exclusion
Zone, its plan was to drop a team of SBS
saboteurs near Rio Grande, the base
from which the Exocet-equipped Super
Etendards had flown to sink HMS Sheffield, the first major British casualty of
the war. In the end, however, Operation
MIKADO was handed over to the Special
Air Service, which planned to crash-land
two C-130s on the runway and then
have the raiders escape to Chile. The
idea was abandoned as suicidal.
The Falklands conflict provided plenty of
firsts. General Belgrano was the first enemy ship sunk by a British submarine
since the end of the Second World War;
the sinking (with old Mark 8 torpedoes,
in preference to the wire-guided Tigerfish) was a turning point in the war, effectively bottling up the entire Argentine
navy in port. Valiant was at sea a record
101 days, and the jettisoning of unexpended ordnance upon it by Argentine
aircraft returning to their base amounted
to the first (unintentional) air attack on
any nuclear submarine. The submarines’
warnings of Argentine sorties, sent from
dangerously shallow water to the task
force, took just two minutes to reach
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their destination with the aid of a satellite
link. The early warning provided by the
submarines saved many lives and was
critical in giving air superiority to the
British liberators of the islands. The Argentine air raids were countered by
short-legged but deadly Sea Harriers
armed with the latest Sidewinders, which
proved to be impressive weapons.
Doubtless there is more to be revealed
about the adventures of a handful of
British submarine officers who survived
the notoriously demanding “Perisher”
command course to play tag with their
Soviet opponents and fight the Argentine
junta. Who could have foreseen a submarine service playing such a role?
NIGEL WEST

European editor of the World Intelligence Review and
editorial director of Saint Ermin’s Press
Berks, England

Harris, Brayton. The Navy Times Book of Submarines: A Political, Social and Military History. New
York: Berkley Books, 1997. 398pp. $15

This historical book is a compilation of
thousands of facts surrounding the evolutionary development of today’s modern submarine. In an effort to separate
fiction from fact, Captain Harris (U.S.
Navy, Ret.) debunks many commonly
held myths that have been perpetuated in
submarine lore.
With twenty-four years of active duty
service, Harris is well suited to speak on
these matters. The huge number of facts
interlaced throughout this work is evidence in itself of the thoroughness of his
research. Harris has also written The Age
of the Battleship, 1890–1922, and a study
of the role of the newspaper during the
American Civil War that appeared in the
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magazine of the Civil War Society, Civil
War. He has written for the Saturday
Review and the U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings.
This book begins with the late sixteenth
century. Little-known names like William Bourne, Frederico Gianibelli, and
Cornelius Drebbel are joined by that of
Robert Boyle (formulator of Boyle’s Law)
in the development of submarine craft.
While Gianibelli carried out the first successful wartime assault using submerged
explosives, Drebbel is credited with the
first craft capable of transporting men
and equipment underwater. Here begins
Harris’s correction of folklore. Drebbel’s
craft, rowed by twelve strong men, did
not actually operate submerged, but
awash. The boat’s submerged operations
became such a fish story that a hundred
years after the event, it was claimed that
King James I himself had ventured underwater in Drebbel’s craft. Harris puts
the matter right.
Harris points out two issues that plague
military inventors. First, wars create necessity; without the threat of war, there
is no drive to create new technology.
Second, bureaucratic inertia is extremely
difficult to overcome. Interest in these
“infernal machines” would wax and
wane depending upon the state of political and military unrest. Inventors and
capitalists had to become politicians to
find support within their governments;
it required the patience of Job to wait
for a bureaucrat to provide the necessary financial backing.
This work is more than a history of the
mechanical evolution of submarines; it
also discusses the legal matters surrounding naval warfare. Harris tells how Confederate president Jefferson Davis
invited ordinary citizens to become privateers, including (and especially)
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submarine privateers. This was by the
1860s considered illegal by most countries in the West: the Treaty of Paris,
signed in 1856, had outlawed privateering. However, since neither the United
States, nor, by extension, the Confederate States of America were signatories to
the treaty, the treaty was nonbinding.
But that did not stop President Abraham
Lincoln from issuing an edict declaring
all privateers “pirates,” subject to death
if caught.
Harris is not without fault. While his
facts are presented in a logical and wellthought-out sequence, he does not provide notes to document his sources. In
addition, his attempts at sarcasm do not
always hit the mark; some come off as
confusing and inappropriate. For example,
he writes, “Johnstone [an Englishman
allegedly hired to build a submarine to
rescue Napoleon Bonaparte] may—or
may not—have had some involvement
with Fulton’s expeditions against the
French at Brest; he may—or may not—
have built a submarine in 1815 with
tepid support from the government. He
may—or may not—have been offered
£40,000 for the effort on behalf of the
Bonapartists.”
Those who wish to learn more about the
political, social, and military history behind submarine development should
read this book. It is probably the greatest
compilation of submarine facts ever published in one volume.
CHRISTOPHER COOPER

Commander, U.S. Navy
Niantic, Connecticut

McCann, David R., and Barry S. Strauss, eds. War
and Democracy: A Comparative Study of the Korean
War and the Peloponnesian War. London: M. E.
Sharpe, 2001. 385pp. $77.95

“At first glance,” the editors of this volume observe, “it seems odd to compare
the Peloponnesian War and the Korean
War.” One conflict was ancient, the other
modern; one was long, the other short;
one featured multiple battles at sea, the
other was essentially a ground war, albeit
with imaginative and potentially decisive
amphibious dimensions.
So why compare these two wars? The reason is that they were (and were perceived
to be) largely struggles between different
kinds of societies—democratic Athens
versus authoritarian Sparta in Greece;
and the liberal-democratic United States
versus international communism in Korea, led by the Soviet Union with assistance from China. These were tests of
democracy during great struggles for hegemony, with Athens ultimately failing
that test after twenty-seven years of war,
and the United States surviving the challenge after forty-odd years of the Cold
War. Why did one democracy succumb
and the other prevail?
Foundations of an answer lie in this
book’s five sections, which respectively
address the character of democracy at
war, the nature of these different wars,
the dilemmas of small states during
struggles between major powers, the dynamics of populism and civil-military relations in these conflicts, and the culture
of democracy at war.
For readers of this journal, the essay by
the noted Thucydides scholar Victor
Davis Hanson is perhaps most important. The institutions of American
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representative democracy and Athenian
direct democracy are radically different,
but their shared political culture, devoted
to equality and liberty, has encouraged a
degree of dynamic innovation no authoritarian government has been able to
match. Nonetheless, it can be dangerously misleading to impose a Cold War
framework on the early struggle between
Athens, a democracy at home but a tyrant over its allies, and Sparta, tyrannical
at home but relatively mild in its treatment of allies. As one contributor, Robert Kagan, suggests, the American-led
anticommunist alliance in Europe and
Asia was not a Delian League, exacting
tribute at sword point and crushing all
who resisted it. Athens turned the Delian
League into something like the Warsaw
Pact, which explains why both Athens
and the Soviet Union were hated and
could not count on voluntary support
from their allies. The willing assistance of
allies for the more benevolent hegemony of
the United States goes far to explain why
the latter succeeded where Athens failed.
Noteworthy too are essays exploring the
problem of maintaining civil liberties and
civilian control of the military. Ellen
Schrecker shows how the Korean War
strengthened McCarthyism in 1950, and
Stephen J. Whitfield considers how the
American populist tradition rendered the
United States vulnerable to the worst excesses of the senator from Wisconsin.
Jennifer T. Roberts’s insightful discussion of the cults of personality attached
to Alcibiades and Douglas MacArthur
helps us understand why “loose cannons”
are less likely to rise to the top in the
United States but also less likely to be
punished as severely as they might deserve. Oddly, the only discussion of the
most infamous demagogue in wartime
Athens, Cleon, occurs not in this section
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but in another essay, on a fundamentally
different topic—an attempt by Josiah
Ober to reconcile Thucydides the realist
strategic theorist with Thucydides the
consummate historian of the
Peloponnesian War.
Perhaps the most striking essay is Gregory Crane’s, on the problems that small
states, like Plataea and Korea, face in preserving their independence and security
when caught up in struggles between
would-be hegemons. Dae-Sook Suh and
Kongdan Oh invite the American reader
to explore the internal dynamics of
North and South Korean policy and
strategy, while Kurt A. Raaflaub and
Dong-Wook Shin offer intriguing perspectives on the bellicose character of
Athenian political culture and the efforts
of Koreans to resurrect a national identity from the ashes of war.
This eclectic mix of essays reminds us that
democracy can be both an asset and a liability to its votaries in time of war.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College

Worth, Richard. Fleets of World War II. Cambridge,
Mass.: Da Capo, 2001. 375pp. $35

In this handy-sized, reasonably priced
book, Richard Worth and his publisher
have provided an excellent instrument of
discovery for readers whose range of interest in World War II includes the many
fleets that fought, and even the few that
only looked on nervously.
Worth describes adequately all the combatants, nation by nation (from Albania
to Yugoslavia), type by type (aircraft carriers to motor torpedo boats), class by
class (oldest to newest), and, for the
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larger types down through destroyers and
submarines, ship by ship (the Americans
in hull-number order, though Worth
does not give the individual numbers).
Worth omits amphibious ships and auxiliaries, “ships whose primary function
was not naval combat,” though he does
include the U.S. Navy’s several dozen
seaplane tenders, large and small. There
are a few other omissions too, some obviously unintended.
Each country’s section begins with a general discussion, “an assessment” of its
fleet, geostrategic situation, tasks, relevant history, and resources, including
weapons (guns and torpedoes). Then
Worth gets to the ships and their aircraft.
He covers Albania in just over six lines;
the United States requires seventy pages.
One should not expect to find portraits
of any particular ship; Worth includes
very few. However, other excellent but
more expensive books provide satisfactory views, as well as individual ship data,
of almost every class of fighting ship of
that war.
Altogether, the index includes about
4,600 ships’ names. However, a host of
unnamed ships and craft (such as the
thousand or so U-boats, the eight hundred American torpedo boats, and the
502 American yard minesweepers, YMS)
must content themselves with one general index entry for each class. Nearly all
classes are to be found in the book—only
nine lines for the 136-foot YMS, with a
fine photo. The U-boats, in all their variations, properly get seven pages.
In a book of this sort one will find errors,
but this reader found few indeed, compared to the great opportunity to commit
errors, and those were small. For example, the German 280 mm gun was much
closer to the eleven inches credited to it
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in other books than to the 11.1 inches
Worth allows. Also, not all American
Clemson-class destroyers built for World
War I “suffered from inferior workmanship.” Only those built by Bethlehem did,
and the U.S. Navy discarded most of
those before World War II began.
The great pleasure of this book lies in
Worth’s clear and succinct commentary.
Regarding a pair of British battleships,
for example, he writes: “The Nelsons were
innovative in many ways, but successful
in few. The nine 16-inch guns seemed a
potent battery, but by the time they
worked out all their bugs, they proved no
more effective than the old 15-inchers.”
The fifteen-inch-gun Queen Elizabeths
“sometimes achieved brilliant gunnery;
as early as Jutland the Germans noted
Valiant’s consistent fire.” In 1940 “at
Calabria, Warspite planted a shot on the
Italian flagship at a range of 26,400 yards,
the longest ship-to-ship hit in history.”
Of the numerous American Fletcherclass destroyers, Worth observes that
they “had a strong armament, long
range, reliability, and irrepressible
toughness. Some of their success came
by inheritance; most units joined the
fleet after the early, unpleasant lessons
of night combat against the Japanese.
However, the Fletchers presented the
perfect vehicle for exploiting those lessons, achieving utter triumph at Cape
St. George and Surigao Strait.” Also,
“most of the losses among the Fletcher
and Sumner classes resulted from kamikaze attacks. In many cases the ships
survived, but the navy in that stage in
the war didn’t bother to repair them.
Hoel succumbed to a more traditional
fate beneath an avalanche of Japanese
gunfire: 40 shells, ranging from 5-inch
to 16.1 inch, stopped her dead in the
water, and subsequent hits finished her
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off. Johnston received 4,700 pounds of
incoming ordnance within the space of
one minute. It wrecked half of her machinery, yet she continued at 17 knots.
. . . After accumulating damage for two
and a half hours, she wallowed so helplessly that her crew couldn’t even properly scuttle her; they simply opened her
watertight doors and let her flood.”
Worth says of the American diesel-driven
Cannon-class destroyer escorts that they
“rolled as badly as the Evarts type,” an
earlier class of destroyer escort that he
reports was prone to “lurid” rolls. The
Navy, according to Worth, considered
the Cannons the least successful of its
several destroyer escort classes. I did not
know the Navy’s official opinion on
those ships, but having a little experience in one of them, I found it an easy
opinion to share.
Discussing briefly another class in which
I sailed, the 173-foot American submarine chasers, Worth reports accurately
that they were “wet forward and generally uncomfortable in heavy seas.” Indeed, in a head sea of any magnitude,
solid water often swept over the pilothouse. With the sea on the beam the
ship proved a deep roller. Still, these little ships “proved seaworthy enough,”
and, Worth adds, “the navy viewed
them as a success.” This also is an easy
opinion to share.
With a substantial library of good books
on the fighting ships of the last century
and a half, I am glad to add Richard
Worth’s Fleets of World War II to my
collection.
FRANK UHLIG, JR.

Naval War College
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Robinson, C. Snelling, 200,000 Miles aboard the Destroyer Cotten. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press,
2000. 320pp. $35

As a midshipman in the 1960s, I discovered J. Bryan’s Aircraft Carrier, the classic
World War II nonfiction “diary” of life
aboard the USS Yorktown (CV 10) in
1945. It remains a great source of insight
into the everyday lives of the men of Task
Force 58 at the height of the Pacific War.
As a junior officer in destroyers, I sought
out similar nonfiction work describing
life aboard “tin cans” during the war, but
I found only two books, both novels. Not
until Robinson’s 200,000 Miles aboard the
Destroyer Cotten have I read anything as
good as J. Bryan’s book.
This book comprises Robinson’s recollections, bolstered by deck logs and his
archive of letters to his parents, of his
experience as a junior officer in Cotten
(DD 669). As such, it is an amalgam of
specific details, his immediate appreciations, and his present-day reflections on
the men he served with, the events of
those years, and the ship itself.
Ensign Robinson was commissioned via
the Naval Reserve Officers Training
Corps at Harvard University in late
spring 1943. He was assigned to the
precommissioning crew of Cotten, which
was then under construction at the Federal Shipyard in Kearny, New Jersey.
Cotten was a “war emergency” Fletcherclass unit, with built-in modifications
based on the wartime experience of earlier sister ships. Laid down on 8 February
1943, the ship was launched and commissioned in just 165 days. Ensign Robinson began his service on Cotten as the
typical junior officer, with a bewildering
series of assignments while the ship was
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fitting out in Kearny. Ultimately, he was
assigned as assistant first lieutenant with
a battle station at “Sky 2,” directing 40
mm antiaircraft guns.
Cotten was quickly dispatched to the Pacific Fleet and began its combat career as
part of Operation GALVANIC, the November 1943 invasion of Tarawa and
Makin. The ship screened the escort carriers and performed antisubmarine warfare patrols.
While Robinson provides some historical
framework to the ship’s operations, the
strength of the book is the insight it provides into the daily life of a destroyer
wardroom during this extraordinary
time. As the war progressed, Cotten
was assigned to Destroyer Squadron 50
and participated in the great Central Pacific campaign, continuing from Tarawa
all the way to Okinawa. The ship performed all the classic destroyer duties,
such as screening the fast carriers and
steaming with the battle line, at the same
time coping with weather, overdue maintenance, and, of course, an implacable
and terrifying enemy. Robinson’s descriptions of depth-charging sonar contacts and engaging low-level torpedo
bombers reaffirm the adage about war
being “hours of boredom and seconds of
terror.”
Robinson learned about the insularity of
destroyer life, and he describes it well. He
depicts how the world seemed to collapse
into the restricted horizons of the wardroom and watch teams, and recalls vividly his quest to qualify as a fleet officer
of the deck. He evokes some of the exhilaration of high-speed destroyer
shiphandling in fleet operations, at a
time when destroyer divisions maneuvered at a standard distance of five hundred yards and were constrained by
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nothing except gross tonnage and the occasional floating mine.
Robinson ends the book with an epilogue
that tells of Cotten’s Cold War service.
He also includes appendices that discuss
the characteristics of the Fletcher-class
destroyers and the Cotten’s awards, as
well as a glossary.
There is a minor error in one photo caption, and the maps could have been
better, but these are minor quibbles. The
book’s greatest strength is Robinson’s
recollections of his experiences in Cotten,
providing an evocative and accurate depiction of a valuable part of a great naval
campaign. While the book is not quite
the “DD version” of Bryan’s classic, it is
well worth reading, particularly by destroyer veterans.
WILLIAM COOPER

Chula Vista, California

Moretz, Joseph. The Royal Navy and the Capital
Ship in the Interwar Period: An Operational Perspective. London: Frank Cass, 2002. 292pp. $57.50

The Royal Navy is often held up as an example of a military organization that
failed to innovate in peacetime. Its critics
maintain that naval officers spent the
interwar years preparing to refight the
Battle of Jutland when they should have
been thinking about the new operational
challenges presented by aircraft carriers
and U-boats. At the root of the problem,
these critics argue, was an increasingly irrational devotion to the capital ship (a
term that encompasses both the battleship and the battle cruiser). In recent
years, however, historians have challenged the image of an intellectually
stilted and hopelessly reactionary officer
corps. The Royal Navy and the Capital
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Ship in the Interwar Period builds on such
work to present a more sympathetic picture of a service struggling with inadequate budgets, global responsibilities,
and rapid technological change.
The Royal Navy emerged from the First
World War with its faith in the supremacy of the capital ship largely undiminished. Battleships were clearly vulnerable
to attack by aircraft and submarines, but
as Joseph Moretz demonstrates, the naval
profession believed that the risks to these
ships would be manageable, a view that
was confirmed by the experiences of the
Spanish Civil War. With naval aviation
still in a formative stage of development,
there was as yet no reliable and tested alternative to the capital ship. Nevertheless, aircraft carriers were regarded as an
essential and integral part of any British
battle fleet, valuable not just for spotting
and reconnaissance but also as a striking
force. The main impediment to the development of naval aviation in the interwar era was less a lack of imagination
than a constant shortage of funds, as well
as the control by the Royal Air Force
(until 1937) of the Fleet Air Arm. By the
beginning of the Second World War, the
Royal Navy’s initial commanding lead in
naval aviation had vanished.
Challenging the traditional view, Moretz
argues that in this period the Royal Navy
strove to overcome known deficiencies
and meet future challenges through a
sustained process of fleet exercises and
experimentation. Its accomplishments in
this area were mixed. As the author
notes, the gunnery proficiency of British
capital ships actually decreased through
much of the interwar period, due in large
part to budgetary restrictions and the
problems of assimilating new technology.
The service was willing, however, to consider such measures as night fighting and
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new divisional tactics in its effort to
retain a qualitative edge over its increasingly numerous prospective enemies.
Capital ships were also employed in such
peacetime tasks as “showing the flag,”
providing aid to civil authorities, and deterrence. Moretz maintains that the capital ship’s utility across the entire spectrum of operational activity bolstered the
Royal Navy’s case for their retention. The
evidence produced to support this claim
is unconvincing, however. Peacetime
tasks were usually undertaken by smaller
warships that were better suited to them.
It was only in demonstrations of British
power to deter aggressors in crisis situations that heavy ships were essential, but
even here, Moretz suggests, their record
was notably weak, given their failure to
deter Japan in 1941.
Other chapters attempt to provide context for the Navy’s capital ship policies,
but the results are uneven. Moretz often
seems out of his depth when he strays
into broad questions of naval policy. For
example, he attributes Britain’s willingness to enter into a series of arms control
agreements almost entirely to financial
considerations, though other factors were
often of equal or greater importance.
This propensity to oversimplify complex
issues is also obvious in the chapter on
interwar naval strategy, which ascribes
Britain’s difficulties to the maintenance
of the “one power standard” (which was
not replaced by a two-power standard in
1938, as the author claims) and the
Navy’s unwillingness to divide its fleet
between two distant theaters (which is
precisely what it did plan to do for most
of this period). Moreover, while Moretz
correctly notes that the Navy developed
different strategies for Europe and the
Far East, he is not clear on what those
strategies were. This problem stems from
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insufficient research and a tendency to
conflate fleet exercises with strategic
planning.
Nonetheless, and while the background
material that makes up a significant portion of this study is not always reliable, the
book is of value to the specialist for the
fresh perspective it offers on the Royal
Navy’s response to the operational challenges of the interwar period.
CHRISTOPHER BELL

Naval War College

Chisholm, Donald. Waiting for Dead Men’s Shoes:
Origins and Development of the U.S. Navy’s Officer
Personnel System, 1793–1941. Palo Alto, Calif.:
Stanford Univ. Press, 2001. 883pp. $125

Donald Chisholm has provided us with
an important book. It is the first comprehensive history of the development of the
U.S. Navy’s officer personnel system.
Others have provided portions of the picture; Christopher McKee’s A Gentlemanly
and Honorable Profession: The Creation of
the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794–1815 is
an excellent treatment of the early years.
But the Royal Navy, from which many
American practices derive, is more thoroughly covered. Extensive coverage of the
Royal Navy is to be found in Michael
Lewis’s British Ships and British Seamen
(1940); The Navy of Britain: A Historical
Portrait (1948); A Social History of the
Navy, 1793–1815 (1960); and The Navy
in Transition, 1814–1864: A Social History
(1965). William Laird Clowe’s magisterial seven-volume The Royal Navy: A History from the Earliest Times to the Present
(1897), although dated, remains impressive. Yet no one has provided for the U.S.
Navy books of such depth and coverage
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until now, with Chisholm’s impressive
work.
Chisholm’s intent goes well beyond a historical recounting of events. His stated
aim is “to explore how institutions are
created and elaborated, to assess the usefulness of the problem-solving conception of decision for so doing, and to
relate the previously untold story of the
origins and development of the U.S.
Navy’s officer personnel system.” Chisholm believes that the problems faced by
the Navy’s officer personnel system parallel in many ways those faced by other
large-scale organizations. He is at least as
interested in process as he is in outcome,
and he draws with impressive scholarship
upon multiple disciplines, including not
only history but political science, sociology, strategic management, foreign policy, and public administration. Although
Chisholm’s vehicle is the detailed study
of naval officer personnel management,
he uses that as a means of studying organizational management in a broader context. In this he is successful. Extensively
researched in primary sources and thoroughly documented, his book is a major
contribution to organizational theory.
The author’s intended audience is the
community of naval officers—past, present, and future—congressional scholars,
and students of American political development. However, an even wider audience will appreciate this study for its
insights into institutional problem solving, modification, and growth. However,
even a comprehensive study such as this
must set its limits. To make things manageable, Chisholm chose to omit the staff
corps and Marine Corps, the development
of the reserves, the creation and modifications of the Naval Academy curriculum,
and the enlisted personnel system.
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It took almost 150 years to construct the
naval personnel system that existed at the
beginning of World War II. Chisholm
makes clear that this system did not
come about because of any grand design
but as the result of an infinite series of
incremental decisions made to solve
problems as they arose. The three main
motivations behind these decisions were,
Chisholm argues, efficiency, equity, and
economy. “Efficiency” in this sense refers
to the most economical use of resources,
more closely resembling what might be
called “effectiveness.” “Equity” is concerned with protecting the rights of officers. “Economy” ensures the least
possible cost at all times. First one, then
another of these goals prevailed as the
Navy interacted with the administration
and Congress during its periodic expansions and contractions. The interaction
between the Navy and Congress in addressing naval personnel problems represents a major portion of the historical
action recounted here. Of particular
value is the report on congressional naval
debates, offering not only the bills that
passed but the full flavor of the debates,
including the attempts (both successful
and not) to amend them and the arguments presented. This gives us an idea of
not only what happened but also of what
might have been.
The title of the book is taken from the
memoirs of Rear Admiral Yates Stirling,
Jr.: “With all its faults, and there are
many, the Navy has accepted selection
because it brings officers to high ranks
young enough to be at their best. Promotion by seniority, waiting for dead men’s
shoes, is a sad blow to efficiency, for it
stifles initiative and offers no incentive.”
Yet for well over a century, promotion by
seniority prevailed. It took until what
later came to be called the Line Personnel
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Act of 1916 for the Navy to adopt “selection up” as the means for determining
who was to be promoted. Chisholm characterizes this decision as “the pivotal
point in the navy’s history.” The commanders and captains selected in the
twenty years following the passage of the
act were to become the flag officers who
led the Navy in its greatest test, and finest
hours, during World War II.
The main features of naval personnel organization emerged slowly and
incrementally. Initially the Navy had only
two ranks, lieutenant and captain; flag
ranks were not established until the Civil
War. For many years naval officers’ pay
lagged well behind that of Army officers.
Advancement by seniority resulted in
painfully slow promotion, which resulted
in officers overage in grade. For half the
period covered in this book the Navy had
no means to retire officers. The principle
of selection up was adopted only after
trying a series of other ways to select for
promotion. These included the use of
professional examinations as a screening
device and the establishment of “plucking boards” to accomplish “selection
out.” None, however, proved satisfactory.
Even after accepting selection up, the
Navy still had to figure out how the selection board would work, what criteria
would be used, and the details of fitness
reports. So simple a matter as determining the number of officers needed in the
various grades took years to organize.
One of the great virtues of Chisholm’s
study is his detailed presentation of how
every problem was addressed, describing
the invariable false starts and unintended
consequences that led serendipitously to
a stronger institution. Chisholm argues
that organizations cannot rely upon a
succession of brilliant leaders: “It is that
their rules and procedures—not least
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those that govern the procurement, education and training, advancement, and
placement of their personnel—permit
them to operate effectively with normal
human beings, and to withstand the occasional individual who proves less than
completely competent.”
Gratitude is due to Stanford University
Press for publishing this valuable work,
which even at its steep price is unlikely to
return its costs. For a book that will probably be consulted a great deal, however, it
is too bad that a sturdier binding was not
used. My copy is already beginning to fall
apart.
Chisholm has achieved what he set out to
do in fine style. He has provided a comprehensive history of naval officer personnel management and at the same time
has shed light on the creation, structure,
and problem solving that resulted in the
organization we see today. From now on
it will be impossible to write usefully
about the history of personnel management without reference to this book. It
promises to be a standard authority.
JAMES BARBER

Captain, U.S. Navy, Retired
Davidsonville, Maryland

Lehman, John. On Seas of Glory: Heroic Men, Great
Ships, and Epic Battles of the American Navy. New
York: Free Press, 2001. 436pp. $35

John Lehman, former secretary of the
Navy and author of Command of the Seas
(1988), has with this book produced a
masterful outline of “the grandeur of the
American naval tradition.” The truest examples of this “grandeur” are “best
found in its people, fighting sailors, technical innovators and inspiring leaders.”
From John Paul Jones and the Revolu-
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tionary War to the six-hundred-ship fleet
of the Cold War, John Lehman brings us
a wonderful episodic view of the U.S.
Navy’s people and ships, and their collective contribution to the strength and
character of the nation they have served.
Using both primary and secondary
sources in the United States and England,
Lehman offers an exciting and messageladen portrait of the American naval
tradition, a portrait that is “deliberately
selective and subjective.” In short, this
book is not a typical chronological narrative history of the U.S. Navy but a stimulating history of a highly adaptive
institution.
One of the most intriguing sections is the
story of Joshua Humphreys, the “premier
ship-builder” and “the most innovative
and revolutionary designer of the age of
sail.” Humphreys would design several
warships for the young republic, all of
them larger, faster, and more heavily
armed than similar vessels in England or
France. Collectively known today as the
“super frigates,” this group included such
storied vessels as Constitution, United
States, and President. Even Admiral
Horatio Nelson, the preeminent naval
leader of his day, is quoted by Lehman as
foreseeing “trouble for Britain in those
big frigates across the sea”; the trouble of
which Nelson warned came during the
War of 1812. Throughout, Lehman contends that, contrary to the views of many
historians, privateering had a significant
impact on the outcome of both the
American Revolution and the War of
1812. He argues that “the battles of the
American Revolution were fought on land,
and independence was won at sea.” This
work does much to reinforce such a view.
From the end of the Civil War to the beginning of the Spanish-American War, a
great deal of technological and strategic
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change was absorbed by the “new Navy” of
American Manifest Destiny. Lehman reminds the reader that the “new Navy” was
made possible by the nation’s ever-increasing industrialization. The epitome of these
changes, according to Lehman, was the fast
cruiser USS Olympia, “the product of the
first American military-industrial complex.” The end result of this rapid naval
evolution was a recognized role for the
United States on the global high seas.
Lehman believes that it was President Theodore Roosevelt who dragged the United
States to its true destiny: “TR was the midwife who delivered from the old isolated
America the new international United
States. And his instrument was the Navy.”
It is clear that Lehman holds that, today as
well, the Navy is the instrument of the international United States.
Outlining the role of the Navy in the Second World War, Lehman begins with War
Plan ORANGE. Rejecting Napoleon’s dictum that planned strategies cannot last beyond the opening salvoes of battle, Lehman
asserts that War Plan ORANGE was “the
most successful strategic document in the
history of warfare.” He then discusses key
campaigns of the naval war, including Midway, Guadalcanal, Normandy, Leyte, and
Okinawa.
Among the book’s many unique features
are vignettes of naval personalities. From
the chapter on the American revolution to
that covering the Cold War at sea, Lehman
has laced into his narrative many enlightening and analytical biographies of the
people behind the wood and steel walls of
the fleet—“daring warriors,” “more prudent—less dramatic leaders,” and the “reluctant warriors.” These figures include the
likes of John Barry, John Paul Jones, Stephen
Girard, Uriah Philips Levy, William B.
Cushing, Raphael Semmes, Chester W.
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Nimitz, and Hyman G. Rickover, to
name only a few.
John Lehman has given us a first-rate addition to the historiography of the U.S.
Navy. With its brief bibliography, notes,
and index, this work will benefit the naval enthusiast and the professional seafarer alike. However, this reviewer
particularly commends On Seas of Glory
to professional personnel of the sea services. It will remind them why they decided
to commit their time, and possibly their
lives, to such institutions.
ANDREW G. WILSON

George Washington University

Feaver, Peter D., and Richard H. Kohn, eds. Soldiers
and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American
National Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
2001. 545pp. $28.95

If you intend to own only a single volume
on the crucial question of civil-military relations in the United States, choose this
book. It is a comprehensive (indeed, exhaustive) review of the literature and commentary surrounding this timely debate. (A
synthesis appears as the lead article in this
issue.) It addresses what former secretary of
defense William Cohen described as a
“chasm” in American society. The editors
have assembled a wide variety of commentators who examine two fundamental questions: Are the American armed forces and
the civilian sector drifting apart as the
result of a lack of shared values and neartotal ignorance by the civilians of the military role? If so, what are the potential consequences for U.S. society?
The answer to the first question seems relatively easy. Clearly there is a growing divergence between civil and military sectors of
society. This conclusion is based on
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fundamental facts: the end of the draft in
the early 1970s, and the resultant lack of
firsthand exposure to military life; the
dearth of elected representatives who have
military experience or exposure, especially
now that the World War II generation is
passing into history; surveys conducted by
a wide variety of credible institutions; and
general sociological and demographic
changes.
The more interesting question is, does it
matter? After all, one could argue that
there have always been “gaps” between
the sectors in American society and that
there is sufficient fundamental respect
for civilian authority in the military ethos
and culture to ease any concern. The
contributors to this volume apply skill
and insight to answer both of these
questions.
Much of the work is based on a wideranging survey of civilians—both leaders
and academics—as well as of military officers and the public at large. The baseline
work was conducted by the well-regarded
Triangle Institute for Security Studies, buttressed here by the analyses of a superb
group of commentators. Their broad assessment is that the gap is real and has undermined cooperation between the military
and civilian sectors. They see indications
that it may reduce overall military effectiveness and produce wider consequences, although specifics are hard to define. This
finding is clearly in the mainstream of
thought, including the expressed view of
military people found in various surveys
that there is reason for “serious pessimism
about the moral health of civilian society
and that the military could help society become more moral, and that civilian society
would be better off if it adopted more of
the military’s values and behaviors.”
In addition to the survey work are significant historical sections that put the debate
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in perspective. The fine essay by a leading
American military scholar, Russell Weigley,
“The American Civil Military Cultural Gap:
A Historical Perspective, Colonial Times to
the Present,” is worth the price of the book
in itself. Additionally, Eliot Cohen, distinguished professor at the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies
and a frequent commentator on this topic,
provides an exceptional discussion on the
question of the use of force as it plays in
this debate.
In their conclusion the editors outline the
path ahead. While they make clear up front
that “no problem identified is so acute or
urgent as to require a drastic response,”
they offer a series of relevant ideas meant to
ensure that these sectors of our society
maintain a healthy alignment. This book
will provide an excellent springboard for
future assessment.
Overall, this is an excellent survey of a vital
topic in national security studies. It deserves to be read by anyone serious about
civil-military relations in the United States
today.
JAMES STAVRIDIS

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Navy Operations Group, CNO Staff

Harvey, Miles. The Island of Lost Maps: A True Story of
Cartographic Crime. New York: Random House,
2000. 405pp. $24

In 1995 a middle-aged, well dressed, inconspicuous man attracted the attention of an
alert librarian at the George Peabody Library in Baltimore, Maryland. This man
was Gilbert Bland, Jr. Notwithstanding his
appearance and name, however, the crime
he was committing was hardly unassuming.
Gilbert Bland (alias James Perry), using the
razor-and-fold technique, had stolen from
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library manuscripts nearly 250 antique
maps valued at half a million dollars. A few
of the maps were more than four centuries
old. He had cut a swath through libraries
from the University of North Carolina, the
University of Chicago, the University of
Washington, and Duke University to the
University of Virginia. Many other institutions had also been victimized. In the end
only a little over two-thirds of the maps
were returned to their owners.
Miles Harvey, a journalist, began reporting
on the thefts in 1996 for Outside magazine.
However, the reader’s fascination with this
book would quickly fade if it were only a
simple crime story. Harvey’s investigation of
Bland steps beyond the bounds of a contemporary event to touch every aspect of
cartography.
Charts and maps become the central characters of this story as it delves into
“cartomania”—the history of cartography,
going back to cultures and times when maps
were closely held state secrets, stolen by agents
for the benefit and profit of other countries.
One Carthaginian sea captain sank his ship
rather than let his charts fall into Roman
hands. Christopher Columbus is suspected of
having absconded with a copy of Florentine
Paolo del Pozza Toscanelli’s world map,
which may have shown a westerly sea route to
the Indies. Spanish ships kept their official
charts in lockboxes secured by two keys, one
held by the pilot-major and the other by the
cosmographer-major. A map by Martin
Waldseemuller depicting the New World in
1513 named it after the first Spanish pilot-major, Amerigo Vespucci, under the mistaken impression that he had been the
discoverer.
The economics of maps is revealed to us in
Harvey’s book. In the latter half of the
twentieth century, W. Graham Arader III
transformed an erudite hobby into an expensive business when he sold a single 1482
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Ptolemy, printed on vellum, for nearly two
million dollars. The dark side of this world
is also revealed. Elegantly framed maps
might be the results of book “breaking,”
taking advantage of the fact that individual
pages of an atlas can be worth more money
than the bound volume. Harvey chronicles
the history of cartographic crimes; Bland is
not unique. Apparently respectable members of society—such as Robert M. “Skeet”
Willingham, Jr., librarian, Sunday school
teacher, and city council member; Fitzhugh
Lee Opie, direct descendant of General
Robert E. Lee; and William Charles
McCallum, graduate of Yale University and
Boston College Law School—have all been
involved in stealing maps.
Bland’s crime reveals that the guardians of
bibliographic treasures are easily penetrated security systems. The conflict between a library’s goals of open access and
security is not an easy one to solve. Beyond
budgets, the dissemination of knowledge
requires accessibility; preservation and security require the opposite. The attitudes of
librarians and their institutions have created a climate where theft is relatively easy.
Some do not have inventory controls adequate to let them know when something is
missing. Some do not wish to be told that
they have been robbed, while others deny
it, for fear of losing patrons and financial
backing.
This work is an introduction to a fascinating subculture. The writing style may irritate readers who want a linear revelation of
a nonfiction topic, but in the end, the meandering exposition connects the many activities and bits of knowledge. Harvey
imbues the book, and consequently the
reader, with his exuberance about and interest in all aspects of maps.
XAVIER MARUYAMA

Naval Postgraduate School

Monterey, California
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